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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this judgment of the Utah Court 
of Appeals pursuant to Section 78A-3-102(3)(a) of the Utah Code, which is by writ of 
certiorari under Section 78A-3-102(5), Utah Code Annotated. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue: Whether the court of appeals erred in its construction and/or application of 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(10). This issue is subdivided into the issues of (a) whether the 
court of appeals erred by adding a third prong to the two-prong test for cohabitation 
previously established by the Utah Supreme Court under Section 30-3-5(10); and (b) 
whether the court of appeals erred by removing the burden-shifting element of 
cohabitation inherent in Section 30-3-5(10) previously established by the Utah Supreme 
Court. Both of these are legal determinations. 
Standard of Review: When reviewing cases pursuant to a writ of certiorari, the 
Utah Supreme Court reviews the decision of the court of appeals, not that of the district 
court. The Utah Supreme Court reviews the court of appeal's legal determinations for 
correctness. Rawlings v. Rawlings, 2010 UT 52, ^ f 20. 
Issue: Whether the court of appeals erred in its review of the district court's 
factual determinations. 
Standard of Review: When reviewing cases pursuant to a writ of certiorari, the 
Utah Supreme Court reviews the decision of the court of appeals, not that of the district 
court. Rawlings v. Rawlings, 2010 UT 52, f 20. Appellate courts defer to a trial court's 
factual findings unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous. Jensen v. Jensen, 2007 
UT App 377, 173 P.3d 223. Therefore, in this case, unless the District Court made 
clearly erroneous factual determinations, the court of appeals erred when it failed to 
uphold such determinations. 
CITATION TO OPINION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
The court of appeals' decision can be found at Myers v. Myers, 2010 UT App 74, 
231P.3d815. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are relevant to this 
Appeal. 
Statutes: 
1. Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5(3) (1985): 
Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse shall be 
terminated upon application of that party establishing that the former spouse is 
residing with a person of the opposite sex unless it is further established by the 
person receiving alimony that the relationship or association between them is 
without sexual contact. 
2. Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5(8)(g)(i): 
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders 
regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not 
foreseeable at the time of the divorce. 
3. Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5(10): 
Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates 
upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is 
cohabitating with another person. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a case involving the issue of alimony termination pursuant to Section 30-
3-5(10), Utah Code Annotated, and involves the meaning and method of establishing 
"cohabitation." 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS & DISPOSITIONS IN OTHER COURTS 
A decree of divorce was entered in this case on June 6, 2006, which awarded 
Appellee (hereafter "Ex-Wife") alimony. R. at 187-188. On January 31, 2008, Appellant 
(hereafter "Ex-Husband") filed a Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce, seeking to 
terminate alimony for Ex-Wife's cohabitation, among other reasons. R. at 92-94. On July 
1,2008, a bench trial was held in the Fourth District Court of Utah County, the 
Honorable Samuel McVey presiding. R. at 176. After hearing evidence, the Court ruled 
from the bench that Ex-Wife had cohabitated, and terminated Ex-Husband's alimony 
obligation pursuant to Section 30-3-5(10), Utah Code Annotated. The Court entered 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on October 6, 2008. R. at 191-192. Ex-Wife 
appealed the trial court's decision on October 29, 2008. The court of appeals reversed 
the trial court in a decision entered April 1, 2010. Myers v. Myers, 2010 UT App 74. Ex-
Husband file a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with Utah Supreme Court on April 28, 
2010. The Utah Supreme Court granted Certiorari on July 27, 2010. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The parties were divorced on June 6, 2006. R. at 188. 
2. At least as early as October 25,2006, Ex-Wife was living with her parents. 
She reported to the court in a criminal case that she resided with her parents 
on that date. (Tr. at p. 13; Tr. at p. 48:10-14; Tr. at pp. 76-77; Tr. at p. 
116:2-7; Plaintiffs Exhibit l1). 
3. During the same period, M.H. began living in the same house as Ex-Wife. 
Tr. at 127:2-4, 132:15. 
4. Ex-Wife was living at her parents' home without paying any rent or other 
expenses, which her parents paid for her and M.H. (Tr. at p. 128:9-11; Tr. 
atp. 144:11-13). 
5. Ex-Wife's parents were not aware of or able to control the sexual 
interactions that were occurring among the residents of their home (Tr. at p. 
131-132; Tr. atp. 137). 
6. Ex-Wife and M.H. lived in the same house, with Ex-Wife's, for at least five 
months, and possibly longer (Tr. at p. 13, lines 17-25; Tr. at p. 115:3-5; Tr. 
at p. 116:2-7; Tr. at p. 162:21-25; Affidavit of Misty Myers, received by the 
trial court as an Exhibit, and which the parties' counsel stipulated before 
1
 The trial court apparently lost all of the exhibits, as none of them are part of the record 
(although they are referred to as having been marked and received in R. at 169 and in the 
trial transcript at various locations). Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 was a document prepared by 
Appellee on October 25, 2006 in connection with a criminal charge against her, in which 
she represented to the Court that her residence was 867 North 2600 West, Provo, Utah 
84601—the same address as that at which she and M.H. cohabitated. 
the court of appeals was part of the lost exhibits below and part of the 
record on Appeal, attached hereto as Addendum E, fflf 5, 6. 
7. Ex-Wife and M.H. both came and went from the house as they pleased (Tr. 
at p. 8; Tr. at p. 115:3-5; Addendum E, f 11, 12). 
8. Ex-Wife and M.H. slept in the same room together on one or more 
occasions (Tr. at pp. 103-104; Affidavit of Bryce Myers, received by the 
trial court as an Exhibit, and which the parties' counsel stipulated before 
the court of appeals was part of the lost exhibits below and part of the 
record on Appeal, attached hereto as Addendum F, ^  4. 
9. Ex-Wife and M.H. received their mail at that same address, including 
alimony payments from Ex-Husband (Tr. at p. 14:2-4; Tr. at p. 40:5-7; Tr. 
at p. 128:4-8). 
10. Ex-Wife did not provide any rent receipts or other documentary evidence to 
show that she or M.H. had any other address at which either of them 
resided (Tr. at p. 39:17-22). 
11. Ex-Wife claimed that she did not have any other permanent address except 
her parents' address, where she and M.H. resided (Tr. at p. 14:5-10). 
12. Ex-Wife and M.H. were seen coming and going from the house together 
(Tr. at pp. 8-9). 
13. Ex-Wife and M.H. had a romantic relationship (Tr. at p. 115:3-13; 
Addendum E,t 10). 
Ex-Wife and M.H. treated each other as boyfiiend dnd girlfriend. 
(Addendum F f 4, Tr at p 11 S:3-5; Addendum E, 1j 8). 
Ex-Wife and M.H. were inseparable (Addendum I "f I il |i I I > 
l i ji )« I II! ! I \ddendum E, | 6). 
Ex-Wife and M.H spent the night together in Salt Lake City (It at p 
1 H i -9; Addendum h 11LK 11 at p. I I J \ Addendum 1 fl|| 1 ). 
I \ Wff< \ u l^m 1<M\ is il llir house nil U III nl ll\e ditlcienl ou MOIIS when 
a private investigator drove by the house (Ir. at p. 9:9-16). 
The observations of Ex-Wife's son led him to believe that I" \ Wile and 
J i l l u i i I la iiij.* a si. MI il ii lalioii »lnp uld iiiliiiii 1 ]\ s 
Ex-Wife and Mil . interacted and behaved in a way that was consistent with 
a romantic relationship (Tr. at p 11S, Addendum F f7 10) 
1 '\ ill and M II attended paities to^elhei, at adc In idi\ an I nU I r 
thuimh 1he\ were nrlfriend and ho\luend(Ir. at p. 113.3-5; Addendum E, 
118). 
1 \AVileandMH llnled with each othei (Addendum 1 }\ 1). 
r> Wife and I I II Ion III tulh i H li ill) i it linusnnd u led heart-broken 
and love-sick during those fights (Addendum F |^ ^ I 
Ex-W lie tlevv into a jealous rage when she thougli that M 11 was spending 
Innt Mill i lb* i Jiiils and Jit assunndln i i lu ilim* on In I I i i | 
109:9-25; Addendum F, ||f 6-7). 
24. Ex-Wife admitted to her daughter that she was aware of what would happen 
if she and M.H. got caught together (after Ex-Wife's daughter became 
aware of certain letters between Ex-Wife and M.H.) (Tr. at p. 115:3-5; Tr. 
at p. 123-124; Addendum E, %10). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court of appeals erred by expanding the showing needed to establish 
cohabitation. It mandated that trial courts not terminate alimony unless they find certain 
factors to exist regarding common residence—factors that the Utah Supreme Court, in 
Haddow v. Haddow, ruled were not a necessary requirement to establish common 
residence. 
The court of appeals also improperly assumed that Utah's legislature, in a 1995 
amendment to Section 30-3-5 of the Utah Code, jettisoned the burden shifting 
requirement contained in the pre-1995 statute. The legislature did not manifest any such 
intent, and a review of the legislative history demonstrates no such intent. It appears 
more likely and reasonable to assume that the legislature merely incorporated Haddow's 
common-law process for establishing cohabitation by reference, and thereby streamlined 
the statutory language, without substantively altering it or its burden-shifting (except to 
remove a "homosexual cohabitation" loophole). 
Regardless of whether the court of appeals made errors of law, its primary error 
was that it failed to give proper deference to the trial courts' factual determinations, and 
instead misconstrued the facts in a manner that was least favorable to the trial court's 
conclusions of law. The facts shown at trial were sufficient for the trial court to conclude 
that i K-Wi l> maintained a common abode with another person for more than a temporary 
or short period. The facts shown at trial were also sufficient for the trial court lo 
conclude that bx-VViic had a iclativ ely permanent sexual relationship w illi that same 
poison 1 IN In ill mill M I fiislilinl in finding lh.il .1 condition of < ohabitation existed 
and that alimony should be terminated. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN U S CONS IKIK HON INlMli? 
APPLICATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(10). 
A. THE COUR1 OF APPEALS ERRED BY ADDING A THIRD 
PRONG TO THE TWO-PRONG TEST FOR "COHABITATION" 
ESTABLISHED IN HADDOW. 
In (hiihlow 1 'U/J, 11 II"' I1 M <><>«> 11 l( ill 1 C*1S 1) (hi i 1 mill dt M loped A \\\ 
prong test for establishing cohabitation. Thai test required that the person seeking to 
terminate alimony establish that the other party and her "cohabitant" share a common 
abode as then pimeipal lesideiue loi iiioir lluii a leiiipoui\ in Jmrl prnnd 
Cohabitation is thus established unless the other part\ thereafter proves that there is not a 
relatively permanent sexual relationship (i.e., akin to that existing between a husband and 
witel U at ff71 
1 In 1 inn) of appeals acknowledged that the aforementioned factors of common 
residency and sexual contact are relevant considerations in establishing cohabitation; but 
it then added a third test not authorized bv tladdow. Alter acknow lodging that the trial 
1 inut had t oii^-itleinl \ omnium icsidntr\ iml sexual 1 ontai 1 llu 1 nuil ol appi .lis nil I 
that such analysis was too narrow and that the trial "court must take the next step and 
determine whether the parties entered into a relationship 'akin to that generally existing 
between husband and wife.'" Myers at [^17. 
While Haddow did use the phrase "akin to that generally existing between 
husband and wife," such phrase was used in Haddow to describe the nature of the sexual 
contact between the parties, not to describe other aspects of the parties' relationship, such 
as their common abode. Haddow said that the parties must have "sexual contact 
evidencing a conjugal association," i.e., akin to a husband or wife. Haddow at 672. 
Sexual contact must be of a conjugal nature. Common residence or domicile need not be 
akin to that existing between a husband and wife. 
In Myers, the court of appeals reversed the trial court because the appellate court 
determined that the trial court was mistaken in finding that the Ex-Wife and her partner 
lived in the same residence. The court of appeals ruled that those parties could not be 
found to live in the same residence unless they "shared expenses, shared decision-
making, shared space, [and] shared meals." Myers at ^  18. 
Haddow, mstead of creating a list of required facts (such as shared expenses, 
decisions, space, or meals) to establish common residence, looked at the totality of the 
circumstances to determine whether the parties were living in the same abode. For the 
Haddow court, common residence could be reduced to the simple question: Did they live 
there or not? See Haddow at 674 (citing and quoting In re the Marriage of Gibson, 320 
N.W.2d 822, 824 (Iowa, 1982)). 
Rather than giving deference to the trial court's determination of the simple 
question of whether the parties lived there or not, the court of appeals sought to impose a 
mandatory list of factors that, if not present, would fail to establish a common residence. 
Haddow considered whether to impose such specific factors on the trial courts; but 
decided against it. For example, Haddow evaluated whether to require a showing of 
shared living expenses, sometimes used in other states, to establish cohabitation. 
Haddow explicitly rejected the adoption of such requirement. Haddow at 673 (". .. we do 
not consider the sharing of the financial obligations surrounding the maintenance of a 
household to be a requisite element of cohabitation . . . " ) . 
In the facts of Myers there was sufficient evidence that Ex-Wife and her 
cohabitant resided in the same domicile or abode, despite the fact that the trial court did 
not specifically address evidence of the specific factors of shared financial obligations, 
meals, etc. But, rather than follow Haddow, and look at the total circumstances to decide 
whether Ex-Wife and her cohabitant lived together, the court of appeals added its own 
third prong and specifically incorporated into their new third prong the requirement of 
finding that the parties shared expenses, meals, decisions, and space. Myers at [^18. 
Thus, the court of appeals chose to reverse the trial court's decision because the trial 
court did not find those factors—one of which Haddow expressly excluded as a necessary 
finding. Myers decided that the requirements Haddow rejected as necessary, were 
necessary. 
As the court of appeals erred in mandating that such additional factors are a 
necessary part of establishing cohabitation, and the mandatory inclusion of such is 
inconsistent with the Utah Supreme Court's prior decision, the court of appeals' decision 
should be reversed, as there was sufficient evidence to establish that Ex-Wife and her 
cohabitant shared a common residence. 
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED BY REMOVING THE 
BURDEN-SHIFTING ELEMENT OF COHABITATION 
ESTABLISHED IN HADDOW. 
In Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669 (Utah 1985), this court was asked to 
determine how "cohabitation" should be established in a divorce case. At that time, this 
court did not have an existing standard for establishing cohabitation. It created its own 
common-law standard for establishing cohabitation by adopting a two-prong test.2 That 
two-prong test placed the initial burden on the party seeking to establish cohabitation to 
prove that the other party was residing with a person of the opposite sex. Upon proving 
2
 The two-prong test converted a statutory method of terminating alimony in Section 30-
3-5(3), Utah Code Annotated (1985) into a common-law method of establishing 
cohabitation. This two-prong test, which existed statutorily until 1995, mandated that 
Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse shall be 
terminated upon application of that party establishing that the former spouse is 
residing with a person of the opposite sex unless it is further established by the 
person receiving alimony that the relationship or association between them is 
without any sexual contact. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (1985). 
In 1995, the legislature amended the foregoing statute and substituted the 
following language, which is now codified at Section 30-3-5(10): 
Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates 
upon the establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is 
cohabitating with another person. 
common residency, cohabitation was deemed established unless the cohabitating spouse 
proved that such common residency was without sexual contact. Id. at 672. 
For the last twenty-five years, Haddow has been Utah law regarding the process of 
establishing cohabitation. In numerous cases decided since Haddow, the court of appeals 
has upheld Haddow as the proper method to establish cohabitation. See, e.g., Jensen v. 
Jensen, 2007 UT App 377,173 P.2d 223 (citing Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908, 917 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995)). 
Then, this year, in the instant case, Myers v. Myers, 2010 UT App 74, the court of 
appeals jettisoned part of Haddow's prescribed process. It decided that the burden-
shifting process of establishing cohabitation was no longer valid, and substituted a new 
requirement that the spouse seeking to terminate alimony prove sexual contact. Id. at f^ 
15. 
While the court of appeals acknowledged that a 1995 amendment to Section 30-3-
5(10) was presumably an approval of uthe gloss" of Haddow—a codification of 
Haddow's common-law process for establishing cohabitation, it simultaneously chose to 
reject that process, and substituted its own process—a process that substantially increases 
the burden of proof on spouses seeking to terminate alimony. Id. at 1 15. 
At the heart of the court of appeals mistake was its incorrect assumption that the 
amendment enacted by the legislature in 1995 intended to increase the burden of 
persuasion on the spouse seeking to terminate alimony, by requiring him to prove sexual 
contact. Id. at f 15. A brief review of the legislative history of that amendment does not 
justify any such conclusion. 
HB 36, the amendment to Section 30-3-5 that was presented at the 1995 General 
Session of the Utah Legislature, did not initially propose any change to the alimony-
termination provisions (other than renumbering the subsection). See 1995-FL0272/001 
(11/30/1994 DRAFT), pages 2 & 4, attached with other legislative history items as 
Addendum C. 
While the bill was on the house floor, J. Brent Haymond proposed an amendment, 
which was added to insert the word "in a long-term permanent relationship," after the 
word "residing. See House Floor Amendments to HB 36 of January 23, 1995, attached in 
part as Addendum C. This amendment was subsequently removed from the final version 
of the bill, an apparent rejection by the legislature of imposing a requirement of showing 
a long-term permanent relationship. See Section 30-3-5(10). 
Between January 23 and January 26, 1995, an additional amendment was 
apparently made that completely removed the requirement of proving sexual contact to 
terminate alimony. After this change, the relevant language of the proposed bill read: 
"Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates 
upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is residing in a 
long-term permanent relationship with a person of the opposite sex." See H.B. 36, 
version of January 26, 1995, attached in part as Addendum C. 
While deciphering some notes and comments on the various legislative history 
documents is sometimes difficult, it appears that the foregoing language was the version 
that initially passed the House. See H.B 36, version with notation in left margin 
regarding passing the house, attached in part as Addendum C. 
Subsequently, the Senate presumably considered the matter and passed a version 
of the bill, and a conference committee reconciled the final versions from both the House 
and Senate. The final version changed the word "residing" to "cohabitating," changed 
the words "person of the opposite sex" to "another person," and removed the language 
"in a long-term, permanent relationship." In addition, legislative intent language was 
added to clarify that the legislature did not intend to condone cohabitation. The result 
was passed by both houses on February 28, 1995 and become law without the Governor's 
signature. See February 17, 1995 Goldenrod copy of HB 36 with notation in upper right-
hand corner of page 3, indicating that it was the Conference Committee report of 
February 28, pages 3 & 4a, attached in part as Addendum C. See also, House Journal of 
February 28, 1995, pages 909-910 and Senate Journal of February 28, 1995, pages 868-
870, attached as Addendum C. 
From this legislative history, the bill that originally passed by the House did not 
intend to require the payor spouse to prove any sexual contact to terminate alimony. The 
payor spouse needed only to prove the element of residence. 
Contrary to the court of appeals' presumption, it does not appear from the 
legislative history that there was any intention to place the burden of proving sexual 
contact on the payor spouse. In fact, a fair reading of the amendment may be that the 
legislature intended to completely discard sexual contact as a required factor to terminate 
alimony. 
Further evidence supporting this conclusion comes from a Memorandum prepared 
by the Office of Legislative Research & General Counsel, dated October 21, 1992, which 
was prepared to advise Members of a divorce task force regarding changes to alimony 
law. This memorandum is among the materials included in the legislative history 
documents on file for HB 36, and is attached as part of Addendum C. 
Legislative Research's memorandum, which legislators presumably relied on in 
deciding how to proceed with the amendment, distinguished "cohabitation" from "sexual 
contact," mistakenly treating them as two separate tests. For example, Legislative 
Research stated, in part, under the heading "Sexual Contact and Cohabitation as Grounds 
for Termination" on page 4 of the Memo: "Currently, several states terminate alimony 
based on cohabitation and sexual contact with a person of the opposite sex." Addendum 
C. After reading the memorandum, the average legislator could not help but assume that 
cohabitation did not require sexual contact—that they were two separate and distinct 
elements. In the memorandum, "cohabitating" was essentially equated with "residing," 
and "sexual contact" was a distinct factor from "cohabitating." If legislators relied on 
that distinction, then they arguably intended to jettison any requirement for proving 
sexual contact when they removed sexual contact as a requirement from the statute. The 
change of the word "residing" to "cohabitating" is easily explained as a response to 
General Counsel's mistaken implication that "cohabitating" meant "residing." 
Another possible explanation is that the Conference Committee recognized that 
removing sexual contact as an element of cohabitation (thereby leaving "residence" as the 
only test), as stated in the House's version of the bill, would, without some additional 
test, result in alimony termination in all cases unless the payee spouse lived alone. 
Surely, the legislature did not intend to terminate alimony for a payee merely because she 
was living in a platonic relationship with a relative. 
It seems likely that more intelligent members of the Conference Committee may 
had recognized the problem, and being aware of Haddow's common-law process for 
establishing cohabitation, simply incorporated Haddow's process and standards for 
establishing and terminating alimony into the statute by substituting the word 
"cohabiting" for "residing." 
The result left alimony termination law essentially unchanged, except to close a 
"homosexual cohabitation" loophole by extending the cohabitation statute to cover 
cohabitation with persons of both sexes, rather than just the opposite sex. 
Legislators, who never defined "cohabiting" in their 1995 amendment, should 
have understood that the common law definition of "cohabitation" in Utah was developed 
by Haddow'§ reference to the pre-1995 version of Section 30-3-5(10). Because Haddow 
defined "cohabitation" by reference to the pre-1995 version, the legislature should have 
understood that by inserting the word "cohabiting" they would essentially codify 
Haddow. Under Haddow, "cohabitation" was the equivalent of the standards outlined in 
the pre-1995 statute, including its burden-shifting process. As they were equivalent, the 
1995 amendment arguably kept the same standard and process for alimony termination, 
but used fewer words to do so. 
Furthermore, substantial issues of fairness and good public policy support an 
ongoing process of requiring the payor spouse to show a common residence, and then 
shifting the burden to require the payee spouse to show lack of a sexual relationship. 
While the process of obtaining evidence needed to show a common residence is 
achievable (e.g., through surveillance of the residence, receipt of mail, address listings in 
directories, etc.), in most cases, it is difficult, if not impossible, for the payor to show the 
existence of a sexual relationship between the payee and a cohabitant. 
By its very nature, sexual contact is private and hidden, and cannot normally be 
discovered unless admitted by one of the persons who engaged in the sexual act. If the 
payee commits perjury about the sexual relationship (and in alimony cases she has strong 
financial incentives to lie, and thereby keep the money flowing), then there is little hope 
of ever proving that sexual contact occurred. 
In some cases, it is possible that the payee's cohabitant may be persuaded to tell 
the truth about the sexual contact; but if the cohabitant and the payee continue to 
maintain a cohabitant relationship, the cohabitant's interests will be closely aligned with 
the payee (both financially and emotionally), and an admission is unlikely. 
In short, if the burden-shifting part of the process is eliminated, then most payees 
will be able to cohabitate with impunity, and will continue to extract alimony payments 
because the payor will not be able to establish sexual contact. The resulting system will 
encourage deceptive cohabitation and discourage marriage, as payees will live with their 
boyfriends in hidden sexual relationships to collect alimony (rather than marry and have 
alimony automatically terminate). The discouragement of marriage is certainly not a 
policy that the legislature intended, as evidenced by the legislative intent statement 
attached to the 1995 amendment to Section 30-3-5(10) (which implied condemnation of 
cohabitation by explicitly clarifying that the legislature did not condone such 
relationships). Addendum D. 
In summary, the court of appeals was mistaken in jettisoning the burden shifting 
requirement established in Haddow and the pre-1995 version of Section 30-3-5(10). 
Legislative history and legislative intent show that Section 30-3-5(10) was amended to 
close a homosexual loophole, not to make any substantive change to the burden-shifting 
process of establishing cohabitation. And sound public policy reasons of promoting 
marriage and discouraging cohabitation, including those voiced by the legislature in 
amending Section 30-3-5(10), support an interpretation of the statute that is consistent 
with an ongoing burden-shifting process. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED BY SUBSTITUTING ITS OWN 
JUDGEMENT FOR THE FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS OF THE TRIAL 
COURT REGARDING COMMON RESIDENCY AND SEXUAL 
CONTACT. 
"In certain instances, the appellate court may exercise equitable powers and take 
upon itself the responsibility of weighing the evidence and making its own findings of 
fact. However, this exception must not become merely a guise under which an appellate 
court substitutes its own judgment for that of the trial court. The appellate court must 
have a valid reason to take this extraordinary step and then only when the appellate court 
is in an equal position with the trial court with respect to the facts and evidence at issue." 
Willeyv. Willey, 951 Y2&22^ 231 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted). 
In this instant case, the court of appeals weighed the evidence itself, and 
substituted its own factual findings and judgment for the trial court's factual 
determinations; but it did so without the benefit of being able to judge the demeanor and 
credibility of the witnesses. The court of appeals was not in an equal position with the 
trial court to judge the facts and evidence at issue. It could not see the expressions of the 
witnesses as they testified; it could not hear their voices or observe their body language. 
Instead, it was limited to the cold, unemotional, typewritten record—a poor substitute for 
the multi-level communication that occurs in courtrooms. 
Instead of viewing the facts presented at trial in a light most favorable to the trial 
judge's ruling, the court of appeals' decision distorted those facts to present them in a 
light most favorable to its own decision and most adverse to the trial court's findings. 
For example, the court of appeals found that there was no evidence that Ex-wife 
and her boyfriend, M.H., shared the same space or established a common household. 
Myers at f 18. To the contrary, the record shows that Ex-Wife and M.H. lived in the same 
house for at least five months, and possibly longer (Tr. at p. 13, lines 17-25; Tr. at p. 
115:3-5; Addendum E, fflf 5, 6), slept in the same room together (Tr. at pp. 103-104; 
Addendum F, f 4), received their mail at that same address, including alimony payments 
(Tr. at p. 14:2-4; Tr. at p. 40:5-7), did not provide any rent receipts or other documentary 
evidence to show that they had any other address at which either of them resided (Tr. at 
p. 39:17-22), claimed that they did not have any other permanent address (Tr. at p. 14:5-
10), were inseparable (Addendum F, \ 7; Tr. at p. 115:3-5; Tr. at p. 118:8-15; Addendum 
E, 16), were seen coming and going from the house together (Tr. at pp. 8-9), had a 
romantic relationship (Tr. at p. 115; Addendum E, f 10), treated each other as boyfriend 
and girlfriend (Addendum F, \ 4; Tr. at p. 115:3-5; Addendum E, f 8), and continued to 
see each other and spent the night together even after M.H. left the common residence 
(Tr. at p. 112:1-9; Addendum F, % 9; Tr. at p. 115:3-5; Addendum E, f 13). In addition, 
Ex-Wife reported to the court in a criminal matter that she resided at the same address 
where M.H. resided at least as early as October 25, 2006 (Tr. at p. 13; Tr. at p. 48:10-14; 
Tr. at pp. 76-77; Plaintiffs Exhibit l3). 
As another example, the court of appeals found there was no evidence that Ex-
Wife and M.H. shared meals. Id. While there was sufficient evidence that established 
the existence of a common residence without taking testimony on shared meals, the trial 
court could have reasonably inferred that Ex-Wife and M.H. shared meals from the 
undisputed fact that Ex-Wife and M.H. were inseparable. (Addendum F, % 7; Tr. at p. 
115:3-5; Tr. at p. 118:8-15; Addendum E, \ 6). The court of appeals should have given 
the trial judge the benefit of that inference. 
The court of appeals also found that Ex-Wife and her boyfriend, M.H., did not 
share living expenses—and viewed this fact as an important factor in showing a lack of 
common residence. Id. Again, there was sufficient evidence to establish the existence of 
a common residence without taking testimony on whether Ex-Wife and her boyfriend 
shared living expenses. 
3
 The trial court has apparently lost all of the exhibits in this case, as none of them are 
part of the record (although they are referred to as having been marked and received in R. 
at 169 and in the trial transcript at various locations). Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 was a 
document prepared by Appellant on October 25, 2006 in connection with a criminal 
charge against her, in which she represented to the Court that her residence was 867 
North 2600 West, Provo, Utah 84601—the same address as that at which she and M.H. 
cohabitated. 
The fact that Ex-Wife and her boyfriend did not share living expenses, while true, 
does not paint an accurate picture of the circumstances of this case. Ex-Wife and her 
boyfriend did not have living expenses to share because the undisputed evidence was that 
Ex-Wife's parents paid all of those living expenses. (See Tr. at p. 15:19-21; Tr. at p. 
128:9-11; Tr. at p. 144:11-13). As there were no living expenses to share, then whether 
they shared those non-existent expenses was irrelevant, and not a factor that should have 
had a bearing on the issue of common residence or cohabitation.4 
The court of appeals also improperly minimized and discounted the sexual nature 
of the relationship between Ex-Wife and M.H. While the court of appeals acknowledged 
that there was a sexual relationship, it attempted minimized the extent of that sexual 
relationship. Instead of giving deference to the trial judge and his view of the evidence, 
the court of appeals preferred to emphasize evidence that the trial judge did not believe. 
For example, the court of appeals pointed out the equivocation in the testimony 
from Ex-Wife's son and the denials of sexual contact made by Ex-Wife. Myers at fflf 6, 
18. In so doing, the court of appeals chose the evidence it liked, and failed to give due 
deference to the evidence the fact finder believed. 
Unlike the trial judge, the court of appeals was not in a position to evaluate 
witness credibility. It did not witness Ex-Wife shifting nervously on the witness stand as 
4
 If the Court of Appeals' decision to require the sharing of living expenses to establish 
common residence is allowed to stand, it is easy to imagine future cases where ex-
spouses and their cohabitants will simply restructure their finances to avoid any sharing 
of living expenses (e.g., by arranging for a sympathetic parent to pay for those expenses), 
and through such fraudulent deception, avoid alimony termination—thus rewarding 
deceptive behavior (which is already too common in alimony termination cases). 
she engaged in obvious deception regarding the nature of her relationship to M.H.; it did 
not witness the angry glares Ex-Wife shot at her son, and the comments she made as her 
adult son began to testify regarding the relationship between Ex-Wife and M.H.—glares 
and comments that had an obvious impact on the son, who began to change his testimony 
from his earlier affidavit (the impact of Ex-Wife's behavior on her son was so obvious 
that the trial judge stopped the proceedings temporarily, cautioned Ex-Wife to stop, and 
then cautioned the son to start telling the truth). Tr. at p. 102:13-103:19. All of those 
facts had an impact on the trial judge's determination of the nature of the sexual 
relationship and the credibility of Ex-Wife's denials. 
In short, while it is true that the evidence of the nature of the sexual relationship 
between Ex-Wife and M.H. was circumstantial and indirect, the trial court was in a better 
position than the court of appeals to judge whether it was more likely than not that Ex-
Wife and M.H. were maintaining a relatively permanent sexual relationship akin to that 
existing between a husband and wife. It did not need an admission by Ex-Wife that she 
was engaged in such permanent relationship to so find. Instead, it could infer that 
relationship from the totality of the circumstances, including the circumstantial evidence 
of sexual contact, and the behavior and demeanor of the witnesses at trial. 
It is a well-established principle of Utah law that circumstantial evidence is a 
sufficient basis for a fact finder to make a factual determination, even without direct 
evidence. E.g., State v. John, 586 P.2d 410 (Utah 1978) (upholding a manslaughter 
conviction on circumstantial evidence, when there was no direct evidence of the 
defendant's actions, except the defendant's own self-exculpatory story). 
In this case, there was substantial circumstantial evidence demonstrating the 
sexual nature of the relationship. In addition to the issues of credibility apparent only to 
the trial judge, such evidence includes that Ex-Wife and M.H. spent the night together in 
Salt Lake (Tr. at p. 112:1-9; Addendum F, f 9), that the observations of Ex-Wife's own 
son led him to believe that Ex-Wife and M.H. were having a sexual relationship 
(Addendum F,13), that Ex-Wife and M.H. slept in the same room together (Addendum 
F, 14); that their relationship was romantic in nature (Tr. at p. 115; Addendum E, f 3), 
that they were inseparable (Tr. at p. 115:3-5; Tr. at p. 118:8-15; Addendum E, f 6), that 
they interacted and behaved in a way that was consistent with a romantic relationship (Tr. 
at p. 115; Addendum E, %% 7,10), that they attend parties together and sat side by side 
and acted as though they were girlfriend and boyfriend (Tr. at p. 115:3-5; Addendum E, f 
8), that they flirted with each other (Addendum F, f 4), that they fought with each other 
at times and acted heart-broken and love-sick during those fights (Addendum F, | 5), 
that Ex-Wife flew into a jealous rage when she thought that M.H. was spending time with 
other girls, and she assumed he was cheating on her (Tr. at p. 109:9-25; Addendum F, f f 
6-7); and that Ex-Wife admitted to her daughter that she was aware of what would 
happen if she and M.H. were caught together (after the daughter discovered letters 
between Ex-Wife and M.H.) (Tr. at p. 123-124; Addendum F, f 10). 
In short, there was sufficient evidence presented at trial from which the court 
could find the requisite elements of sexual contact and common residency necessary to 
terminate alimony. The court of appeals should have given deference to the trial court's 
factual determinations on those issues. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant respectfully submits that the Court of Appeal's 
decision should be reversed, and the trial court's decision to terminate alimony should be 
affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Jj£ day of GOr&&>£&~ 2010. 
GREENWOOD & BLACK 
GUY L. BLACK 
Attorney for Appellant 
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VOROS, Judge: 
^1 Petitioner Becky Sue Myers (Wife) appeals uhe rriel court's 
order :ernmating alimony on uhe ground "chat: she v/as cohaDitatmg 
m her parents1 nome with her parents1 teenage foster son. We 
re/erse. 
BACKGROUND 
^2 Tracy Lynn Myers (Husband) and Wife were divorced m June 
2 0 06, after eighteen years of marriage. Wife was awarded 
alimony. In the months following the divorce, Wife "never had a 
permanent home," but "bounced all over the place." She stayed 
with friends, with her daughters, and with her parents at their 
home in Provo, Utah. 
1|3 Her parents' house had three bedrooms, one of which they 
occupied. The other two bedrooms were occupied by as many as six 
foster boys, including M.H. Grandchildren, great-grandchildren, 
and "ex-foster boys" also slept over from time to time. 
%4 When Wife stayed with her parents, she slept on a couch in 
the basement. She also received mail at her parents' address. 
Wife's family members testified that she never lived there, but 
would sleep over intermittently, "maybe once a month." But a 
private investigator hired by Husband observed Wife's car at her 
parents' house four out of the five days he drove past m June 
2 007, including at least one time early m uhe morning. Based on 
this information, the trial court found "the most credible and 
persuasive evidence" to be that Wife "spent at least 80% of her 
nights" at her parents' home, and that it was, m fact, her 
residence m the spring and summer of 2007. 
^5 At the heart of this dispute is Wife's relationship with 
M.H. The trial court heard no direct evidence that Wife and M.H. 
had a sexual relationship. Wife testified that they did not. 
Husband acknowledged that he had no personal knowledge of a 
sexual relationship between Wife and M.H. Neither party called 
M.H. to testify. 
%6 Several witnesses described Wife's relationship with M.H. 
The parties' son (Son) swore in an affidavit that he "d[id] not 
have any doubt" that his mother was having a sexual relationship 
with M.H., that M.H. spoke of Wife "as his girlfriend," that they 
"flirt [ed] with each other all the time," that he once saw Wife 
pretending to be asleep on the couch wnile M.H. lay on the floor 
next to the couch, that Wife acted jealous when "she thought 
[M.H.] was hanging out \Mth girls," and that he had seen M.H. 
acting "like a heart-broken, love-sick boy." Son also stated 
that Wife once borrowed his car so that she could visit M.H. 
after M.H. had moved to Salt Lake City. But at trial, Son 
equivocated on most of these points, admitting that he had 
"probably not" read his affidavit before signing it and 
acknowledging that he had no proof of a sexual relationship. 
%7 The parties' daughter (Daughter) also testified. Daughter s 
affidavit stated that M.H and Wife " [were] always together 
whenever I [saw] them. " She stated that she began to think there 
was a romantic relationship between Wife and M.H. when Wife asked 
her to get out of the passenger seat of her car so that M.H. 
could sit there. Daughter also observed them at a family party 
sitting "side by side, . . . treating each other as though they 
were boyfriend and girlfriend," and then leaving together. At 
trial, Daughter confirmed many of the statements m her affidavit 
and testified that she believed Wife and M.H. had a romantic 
relationship because they fought like lovers rather than friends. 
f8 Based on this and other evidence, the trial court concluded 
that Husband had established that Wife and M.H. shared "a common 
residency." The trial court then ruled that, Husband having made 
this showing, "the burden of proving a lack of sexual contact 
shifts to [Wife],M and that Wife nhas not met her burden to 
establish lack of sexual contact." On the contrary, the court 
"believefd] that the most credible evidence before the [c]ourt 
indicate[d] that [Wife and M.H.] had a sexual relationship." 
%9 Having found thai: Wife and M.H. shared a common residence 
and had a sexual relationship, the trial court concluded it had 
"no wiggle room to look at equities, to look at fairness or 
anything like that," but "must find that under the Utah Code 
Annotated as amended m 1995 that a condition of cohabitation did 
exist." Accordingly, the court terminated alimony effective 
January 31, 2 0 08." Wife appeals. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1[l0 The sole issue before us is whether the trial court erred in 
concluding that: Wife was cohabitatmg and, consequently, m 
terminating alimony. "Whether cohabitation exists 'is a mixed 
question of fact and law. While we defer to the trial court's 
factual findings unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous, 
we review its ultimate conclusion for correctness.'" Jensen v. 
Jensen, 2007 UT App 377, f 2, 173 P.3d 223 (quoting Pendleton v. 
Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159, 160 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)). 
ANALYSIS 
il 11 Utah Code section 30-3-5 lists seven facuors a court "shall 
consider" m determining alimony. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8) (a) 
(2007).z All but one peruain to financial considerations* 
(I) the financial conditior ana needs of tne 
recipient: spoase, 
(n) the recipient's earning capacity or 
ability to produce income; 
(in) the ability of the payor spouse to 
provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody 
of minor children requiring support; 
1. The trial court noted that Husband had not otherwise 
established a change m circumstances that would have "resulted 
m a termination of alimony based on financial consideration." 
2. The relevant portions of the Utah Code have not changed since 
the divorce. Except as otherwise noted, we cite to the current 
version for the reader's convenience. 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a 
business owned or operated by the payor 
spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly 
contributed to any increase in the payor 
spouse's skill by paying for education 
received by the payor spouse or allowing the 
payor spouse to attend school during the 
marriage. 
Id. In contrast to these mandatory considerations, "the fault of 
the parties" is at most a factor that the court "may consider" in 
determining alimony.3 Id. § 30-3-5(8) (b). 
1f 12 This statutory scheme makes clear that the principal purpose 
of alimony is economic, "'to enable the receiving spouse to 
maintain as nearly as possible the standard of living enjoyed 
during the marriage and to prevent the spouse from becoming a 
public charge. MI Ostermiller v. Ostermiiler, 2008 UT App 249, 
1f 3, 190 P. 3d 13 (quoting Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 
(Utah 1986) ) aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 
2010 UT 43/ see also Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8) (d) ("The court 
may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the 
parties' respective standards of living."). "'Alimony is not 
intended as a penalty against the husband nor a reward to the 
wife.'" English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977) 
(emphasis added) (quoting 2 Nelson Divorce and Annulment § 14.06 
11-12 (2d Ed. 1961 Rev. Vol.)). 
3. The status of this factor is unclear. In Riley v. Riley, 
2006 UT App 214, 138 P.3d 84, a panel of this court held that a 
husband's "extramarital affairs and . . . prolonged deceitful 
conduct . . . present[ed] precisely the type of situation where 
the legislature intended the trial court to consider fault" and 
his "fault [went] a long way in explaining the propriety" of an 
alimony award that "would be too high if only economic factors 
were considered." Id. f 23. Three years later, in Mark v. Mark, 
2009 UT App 374, 223 P.3d 476, a divided panel of this court, 
without purporting to overrule Riley, held that "until the 
legislature clearly defines fault in the statute, it is 
inappropriate to attach any consequence to the consideration of 
fault when making an alimony award." Id. f 20. As the point is 
not essential to the resolution of the case at bar, we leave for 
another day the task of resolving this apparent "evolution of two 
conflicting interpretations of the same legal doctrine by 
different panels of judges." State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 
1269 (Utah 1993). 
tl3 Unless a divorce decree provides otherwise, alimony 
"automatically terminates upon the remarriage or death" of the 
recipient spouse. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9). The recipient 
spouse cannot evade this result by merely cohabitatmg with 
anotner rather than remarrying: "Any order of the court that a 
party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon 
establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse 
is cohabiiatmg with another person." Id. § 30-3-5(10). 
However, this statutory provision has spoken m terms of 
cohabitation only since 1995. Its predecessor statute divided 
the concept into (1) residing with a person of the opposite sex, 
and (2) sexual contact. See id. § 30-3-5(6) (1995). It also 
split the burden of persuasion; proof of common residency shifted 
the burden to the recipient spouse to disprove sexual contact: 
Any order of the court that a party pay 
alimony to a former spouse terminates upon 
establishment by the party paying alimony 
that the former spouse is residing with a 
person of the opposite sex. However, if it 
is further established by the person 
receiving alimony that that relationship or 
association is without any sexual contact, 
payment of alimony shall resume. 
Id. 
H14 In Kaddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669 (Utah 1985), our supreme 
court interpreted this subsection to refer to cohabitation, which 
m this context means "'to live together as nusband and vife.'" 
Id. at 671 (quoting Black's h3v^ Dictionary 236 (5tn ed. 1979) ; 
Webster's N:n:.^ New Collegiate Dictionary 25^ (1984)) .' Thus, 
the court construed the first statutory factor--residing with a 
person of the opposite sex--to mean "tne sharing of a common 
abode that ooth parties consider their principal domicile for 
more than a temporary or brief period of time." Id. at 672. The 
court construed the second statutory factor--sexual contact--to 
4. One term may have different meanings m different statutory 
contexts. Thus, as used in the Cohabitant Abuse Act, the term 
"cohabitant" includes many categories of persons who do not live 
together as husband and wife. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-7-102(2) 
(2008). This court has previously stated that it sees m this 
broader definition "no legislative intent to abrogate the case 
law defining cohabitation m the alimony-termination context." 
Hill v. Hill, 968 P.2d 866, 868 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). It is 
simply the case that "the supreme court has adopted a narrower 
definition m the alimony-termination context than the 
Legislature has m the cohabitant-abuse context." Id. 
mean "participation m a relatively permanent sexual relationship 
akin to that generally existing between husband and wife." Id. 
It thus concluded that "rcohabitation' means to dwell together in 
a common residence and to participate m sexual contact that 
evidences a larger conjugal relationship." Id. at 674. This 
court has consistently applied this two-part test. See, e.g., 
Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159, 161 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); 
Sigq v. Siqcr, 905 P.2d 908, 917-18 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
f15 The legislature evidently approved the gloss Haddow placed 
on the subsection. In 1995, it abandoned any reference to the 
separate factors of common residency and sexual contact m favor 
of Haddow}s focus on cohabitation. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-
5(8) (Supp. 1996). Jettisoned with the two factors was the 
shifting burden of persuasion; since 1995, the spouse seeking to 
terminate alimony bears the burden to establish cohabitation. 
See id. Even after this amendment, however, our cases have 
continued to see the related concepts of common residency and 
sexual contact as key m determining whether a couple is m fact 
cohabitatmg. See, e.g., Jensen v. Jensen, 2007 UT App 377, % 2, 
173 P.3d 223 (citing Sigg, 905 P.2d at 917). Factors bearing on 
this question include whether the parties have keys to a single 
house, see Pendleton, 918 P.2d at 161, keep uheir belongings m 
one home, see Sigg, 905 P.2d at 918, share meals and food 
expenses, see id., and share living expenses or assets, see 
Haddow, 707 P.2d at 671. 
fl6 Making cohabitation the standard for terminating alimony is 
consistent with alimony's purpose of enabling "the receiving 
spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the standard of living 
enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent the spouse from 
becoming a public charge." Qstermiller, 2008 UT App 249, |^ 3 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gayet v. Gavet, 456 
A.2d 102, 103 (N.J. 1983) (" [Tnere is] a policy to end alimony 
when the supported spouse forms a new bond that eliminates the 
prior dependency as a matter of law.'1) . Just as the award of 
alimony "is not intended as a penalty against the husband," 
English, 565 P.2d at 411, neither is the termination of alimony 
intended as a penalty against the wife. 
If 17 In light of the foregoing legal principles, we conclude that 
the trial court took an unduly narrow view of cohabitation. As 
noted above, while common residency and sexual contact are 
certainly key to the question of whether two people have formed a 
relationship resembling a marriage--most married couples do live 
together and have at least occasional sexual contact--the inquiry 
does not end there. A court must take the next step and 
determine whether the parties entered into a relationship "akin 
to that generally existing between husband ano. wi f e . "-' Haddow, 
707 P.2d at 672 . 
i^lS Wife and M.H. clearly did not have such a relationship. In 
the late spring and summer of 2007, Wife spent 80% of her nights 
at her parents' home. Her stay there overlapped with M.H.'s stay 
as a foster child. But he shared an upstairs bedroom with one or 
more male roommates while she slept on a couch m the basement. 
They were romantically involved, were "paired up11 at social 
events, and apparently shared a furtive sexual relationship.6 
They treated each other as boyfriend and girlfriend. But they 
did not establish a common household; we have no evidence of 
shared expenses, shared decision-making, shared space, or shared 
meals. Nor did they maintain na relatively permanent sexual 
relationship akin to that generally existing between husband and 
wife." Id. at 672. Whatever Wife and M.H.'s relationship was, 
it bore little resemblance to a marriage. Accordingly, they were 
not cohabitating for purposes of section 30-3-5(10) . Terminating 
alimony on this ground was error. 
CONCLUSION 
f^l9 The trial court erred in concluding that Wife was 
cohabitating. Although Wife and M.H. sometimes slept under the 
same roof and may have been sexually involved, their relationship 
did not rise to the level of a relationship akin to that of 
husband and wife. Accordingly, terminating alimony on this 
5. Cohabitation is not the same as so-called common law 
marriage. While cohabitation is one requirement of a valid but 
unsolemn!zed marriage, there are others. For example, the couple 
must "hold themselves out as and have acquired a uniform and 
general reputation as husband and wife." Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-
4.5 (2007). 
6. We note that the trial court erred in ruling that once 
Husband proved common residency the burden of proving the absence 
of sexual contact shifted to Wife. As explained above, while the 
pre-1995 statute included this kind of burden-shifting mechanism, 
the current statute does not. It places the burden of proving 
cohabitation on the party seeking to terminate alimony. We also 
note that the evidence on this point was sufficiently tenuous 
that the placement of the burden might have been dispositive 
below. It is not, however, dispositive on appeal. Even assuming 
for purposes of our analysis that Wife and M.H. were having 
sexual contact, they were not living together in a manner akin to 
husband and wife, and thus were not cohabitating for purposes of 
section 30-3-5 (10) . 
ground was error. We reverse and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
1f2 0 WE CONCUR: 
Carolyft-'B. McHugh, £> 
Associate Presiding Judge 
Gregorv^^v/'^OrTne, Judge 
ADDENDUM B 
TRIAL COURT DECISION 
ft&-l 
.* 1 
GUY L. BLACK, No. 6182 
GREENWOOD & BLACK y l ^ C C 
Attorneys for Respondent 
1840 North State Street, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: 801 377-4652 
Facsimile. (801) 377-4673 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BECKY SUE MYERS, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Petitioner, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. 
Case No 064400347 
TRACY LYNN MYERS, 
Judge Samuel McVey 
Respondent. 
This matter came before the Court for trial, the Honorable Samuel McVey 
presiding, on July 1, 2008 Petitioner was present and represented by counsel, Samuel M. 
Barker. Respondent was present and represented by counsel, Guy L Black. The Court heard 
testimony, and arguments from counsel. The Court, having considered the evidence before it 
hereby makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties in this matter were divorced on June 6, 2006. 
2. Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce in this case, Respondent was ordered to 
pay Petitioner $1,200.00 per month alimony. 
In the late spring and summer of 2007, Petitioner began staying on and off 
at her parent's home in Provo. She testified that she spent nights there on 
the weekends. 
There is some dispute as to the number of nights Petitioner spent at her 
parent's home. Some witnesses testified that Petitioner was an infrequent 
guest at her parent's home. However, a private investigator, Mr. 
Hunstman, testified that during the period from June 26, 2007 through 
June 30, 2007, he saw the Petitioner's car at her parent's home on four of 
five days, or 80% of the days he had her under surveillance. The Court 
finds the most credible and persuasive evidence to be that Petitioner spent 
at least 80% of her nights at her parent's home. 
On the 26th of June, 2007, Mr. Hunstman saw Petitioner leave her parent's 
home in the early morning in the company of a young man fitting the 
description of Mike Hart. He saw her drive the young man to 
Independence High School. From this evidence, the Court finds that 
Petitioner and Mike Hart had contact with each other on friendly terms. 
The Court also finds that Petitioner and Mike Hart probably spent at least 
that night in the same house. 
It is undisputed that Mike Hart resided at the home of Petitioner's parents 
during the late spring and summer of 2007. 
7. It is undisputed that Petitioner received mail during the spring and summer 
of 2007 at her parent's home. 
8. It is undisputed that Petitioner listed her parent's home as her address on 
documents she submitted to the court in. a separate criminal case. 
9. Petitioner slept on the downstairs coabli at her parent's home, often 
arriving there late at night. 
10. Petitioner's parents did not charge her rent. 
11. Petitioner did not produce any credible evidence (e.g., rent receipts, bills, 
etc.) to show that she was living at any other address during the spring and 
summer of 2007. 
12. The Court believes that the most credible evidence before the Court is that 
Petitioner's residence during the spring and summer of 2007 was her 
parent's house. 
13. Petitioner was seen in a familial relationship, paired up with Mike Hart 
and going together with him to events as a couple. 
14. Petitioner's parents tried to control Mike Hart and prevent any sexual 
relationship involving Mike Hart. However, they were unable to control 
him and prevent such contact between Mr. Hart and the Petitioner. 
15. On at least one occasion, Petitioner's son discovered his mother alone with 
Mike Hart by the couch downstairs in the home of Petitioner's parents. 
16. There was a sexual relationship between Petitioner and Mike Hart, which 
the Court infers from the common residency of the Petitioner and Mike 
Hart, and which is corroborated by the evidence that Petitioner elected to 
spend the night with Mike Hart in Salt Lake City. 
17. The Court believes that the most credible evidence before the Court 
indicates that Petitioner and Mike Hart had a sexual relationship. 
18. Respondent has been depositing his alimony payments with the Court for 
the last few months. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Petitioner established a residence at her parent's home during the late 
spring and summer of 2007. 
2. Mike Hart resided at the home of Petitioner's parents during the late 
spring and summer of 2007. 
3. Petitioner and Mike Hart had a common residency. 
4. There was a sexual relationship between Petitioner and Mike Hart, which 
the court infers from the common residency of the Petitioner and Mike Hart, and which is 
corroborated by the evidence that Petitioner elected to spend the night with Mike Hart in 
Salt Lake City. 
5. As Respondent has established a common residency between the 
Petitioner and Mike Hart, the burden of proving a lack of sexual contact shifts to the 
Petitioner. While Petitioner denies such contact, her actions indicate otherwise. The 
Court concludes that Petitioner has not met her burden to establish lack of sexual contact. 
6. Pursuant to Section 30-3-5(10), an order for alimony in this case 
terminates upon establishment by the Respondent that Petitioner is cohabitating with 
another person. 
7. In this case a condition of cohabitation exists, and alimony should be 
terminated effective January 31, 2008. 
8. From the funds on deposit with the Court, one-month's alimony, or 
$1,200.00 should be paid to Petitioner, which will satisfy Respondent's alimony 
obligation to Petitioner through January 31, 2008. The remaining balance on deposit 
with the Court should be paid to Respondent. 
DATED this - day of ^ L ^j ^ ^ 2008. 
BY THE COURT: , 
SAMUEL MCVEY / 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
SAMUEL M. BARKER 
Attorney for Petitioner 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify Imail-ed, postage prepaid, by first class mail, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the following, this 
;'_/> day of j) <- ( , 2008: 
SAMUEL M. BARKER 
5295 South Commerce Drive, Suite 200 
Murray, Utah 84017 ,- . J" 
GUY L. BLACK, No. 6182 
GREENWOOD & BLACK 
Attorneys for Respondent 
1840 North State Street, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: 801 377-4652 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4673 
m THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BECKY SUE MYERS, 
ORDER MODIFYING DECREE 
Petitioner, OF DIVORCE 
vs. 
Case No. 064400347 
TRACY LYNN MYERS, 
Judge Samuel McVey 
Respondent. 
This matter came before the Court for trial, the Honorable Samuel McVey 
presiding, on July 1, 2008. Petitioner was present and represented by counsel, Samuel M. 
Barker. Respondent was present and represented by counsel, Guy L. Black. The Court heard 
testimony, and arguments from counsel. The Court, having entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, hereby ORDERS AS FOLLOWS 
1. Respondent's obligation to pay Petitioner alimony is terminated in this 
case, effective January 31, 2008. 
2. The clerk of the court shall pay $1,200 of the funds on deposit with the 
OCT 0 6 ZHUS 
4TB OtSTF?!CT 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COL'tfr" 
Court in this matter to Petitioner, by making such payment payable to 
Becky Sue Myers and Samuel M. Barker, and mailing such payment to 
Petitioner's attorney, Samuel M. Barker. 
3. The remaining balance on deposit with the Court in this matter shall be 
paid by the clerk of the court to Respondent, by making such payment 
payable to Tracy Lynn Myers and Guy L. Black, and mailing such 
payment to Respondent's attorney, Guy L. Black. 
4. The Decree of Divorce in this case is hereby modified, consistent with the 
foregoing. 
DATED this fc day of 0 C^O\QJU 2008. 
BY THE COURT: - " -l='' X 
-A : 1 
SAMUEL MCVEY / 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
SAMUEL M. BARKER 
Attorney for Petitioner 
NOTICE 
Please take notice that the undersigned will submit the above and foregoing document to the 
Court for signature upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date of the mailing certificate 
for this document, plus three (3) days for mailing unless written objection is filed prior to the 
time. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify I mailed, postage prepaid, by first class mail, a 
the foregoing ORDER MODIFYING DECREE to the following, this 
J ^ / , 2008: 
/ 
SAMUEL M. BARKER 
5295 South Commerce Drive, Suite 200 
Murray, Utah 84017 
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ms-mmiynm nmnm DBATT 
1 that are subject lo iasome uqti^dtflg, m srdef Messing against the obligor m %iJMi&w& $1 
2 per moath shesk processwg fee to be M««M in the mmm withheld and p&kt to the Office of 
1 Recovery Services wiUimth«0epaite6Htcf ifeman Servjtses Ibriiie purposes'Ofineoone 
i wkhhoidtog in mmtimot wih Title 6SA, Cfiapter 11, Funs 4 zmd 1 
5 (t) The e#tirf may tedade, in an order detenjjfe% child sapp-otL an order assigning 
6 Samitia! responsibly for all arm jwrfion afdaiJd csreexpense* i wwred on behalf of the 
7 dependent children, necessitated by the etf payment arliBHiiisg of ehe custodfttl jsaretiL If the 
& :ourt ieteraiin^sr that the clroimsf&nc^ are ^ ropriaf6 and thai the dependent children would 
9 be odequateiv cared for, it may includes order allowing the noiKusffidiftl parent to provide 
10 pas d^&Htor I he dependent children, naeea&at&i by the employment w trailing of the 
I i ruftodlal parent 
12 (3) The court h&s ccmtnaihig jaiSsdipdon to make wb^oent change &r nfew orders 
13 for [the support mi rmnttim&G ^tbc-pftrttga?} the custody of the children and their so ppoii, 
14 ntttmefiance, hsafth, $nd denial care, [tiHiw] and for distffttiliot) of the property and 
15 obligations for debts as is ife&atiftbfe mi Eieeessary 
16 (4) (e) b4etenruf5tng visitation riighf&tf parents* grandp-arents, and otlwr iricttik i j ol 
17 the immediate famly, the ecmrt shall co lder the best iffleresi of the child. 
18 fb) Upon t specific fmtiitfg by the court ofthe need for pera offitef tttforcraient, the 
19 court may tacbde ia m order eftftbBst&g & visitation scbediik # provision mong other 
20 things, aolboriztitg any peace officer to enftrce £ court ordered visitation §>qhediite entered 
21 under rhis chapter 
22 (fS) Unites^ d w e e ^ court 
23 thai a pgfty piy aliwony to a fb«icfrflf^^ t^ineitcs upon ^e-fgm«^geH^ 
24 thai feirncy agouae HowevcrT If the rerratfrtogs^fr^^ found-to be void fth Wtiey 
25 pftyi^gt^f t i ^ paying aftwoey b made e-par t^tHbc^^ 
2fi HHffljIinetff and Ms righto m^4m^mml^\ 
27 [(6H%ijN?pfer^f tfe eotift tfa&ft party pay tltmoey te> ii^ 3f»fflr!gpni^ c teiroftfttcs 
2$ ttpo»4ftiflftrt^^ dimply jhgt &®fQmm*$pmmJfam$$ng wfofa A 
2§ pewn oftfee opposite wiaL' tl6Viitw^?#ftiat farther wtfl^ llgfegd by the per»i f^fe^gtg 
^^ A ? n S If a petition for tnodifeatiGis of cMId cn^^ly or vis'tftion provaSitei^  ofa coiirt 
- 4 -
t order; rggsrdms alim^x-fcaacd on a mutgrifil,change in drcmMtmcgr, 
2 m Thfe efrttrt may not modifr timtmv to address nafla oftfaewripfaft that did not 
3 extst at this time ihe decttsb wast entered. 
4 fiS) The<&urt*hould not sward a nominal jsum of alimony at the ttme the, deqnec q 
5 attgedinjn tftemot to eresafye tfa? right to^iimdnv. but gTriJB.imeB8.and determine alimony 
6 roacaordaticg with the antddfaesdesctibed in this section at thu time the decree Is entered 
7
 lias subsection does net atfecrjQrJMLtkJEhI.ffEayeeiofeat sooose to curate a new order for 
S or modification of alimony in accordance ^ .Subsection ft) 
9 (tv) In deicntmwq the payor's ability to provide support, the income ptany 
10 subsequent MouBcof the payor may not beconsidered. 
11 ftfl Alimony mm mi be ordered for a duration longer than the mnrther af visars that the 
12 m&rnayg Existed mnJessitef court .find* oflenuatinft circumstances tfart 'psfifv the payment of 
13 i&tmm fef a ianaef period of time. 
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REVISION OF AUMOOT STANDARDS 
HOUSE FLOOR AMENDMENT!? JAMJARr 23, m$ 2i49 PM 
Represeaiative J. Brent HaynHwid proposes the fotiowks ameodnjents: 
I Page- 4, Line 25: After "igstdfflft" Insert "in a long-term, permanent 
2, Page 4, Line 26, After "jse*." delete die remainder of line 26, 
3. Page 4. Line 27: Ddeta line 27. 
H.B.36 0I-0S45 5:48 PM 
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Legislative Research's memorandum, which legislators presumably relied on in 
deciding how to proceed with the amendment, distinguished "cohabitation" from "sexual 
contact," mistakenly treating them as two separate tests. For example, Legislative 
Research stated, in part, under the heading "Sexual Contact and Cohabitation as Grounds 
for Termination" on page 4 of the Memo: "Currently, several states terminate alimony 
based on cohabitation and sexual contact with a person of the opposite sex." Addendum 
C. After reading the memorandum, the average legislator could not help but assume that 
cohabitation did not require sexual contact—that they were two separate and distinct 
elements. In the memorandum, "cohabitating" was essentially equated with "residing," 
and "sexual contact" was a distinct factor from "cohabitating." If legislators understood 
that distinction, then they arguably intended to jettison any requirement for proving 
sexual contact when they removed i&Sf refukement from^ statute. The change of the 
word "residing" to "cohabitating" (^gM=atee-be- easily explained as a response to General 
Counsel's mistaken implication that "cohabitating" meant "residing." 
Another possible explanation is that the Conference Committee recognized that 
removing sexual contact as an element of cohabitation (leaving residence with another 
person as the only test), as stated in the House's version of the bill, would, without some 
additional test, result in alimony termination in all cases unless the payee spouse lived 
alone. Surely, the legislature did not intend to terminate alimony for a payee merely 
because she was living in a platonic relationship with a relative. 
V£ 
It seems likely that more intelligent members of the Conference Committee ri£§if 












Voting in the negative were: Representatives 
Alexander B. Allen Bradford Bresnahan 
B u s h
 Chard R.Evans Garn 
Goodfeilow Hendrickson Hunter Jensen 
B.Johnson Lockman Mortimer Murray 
0 1 s e n
 N.Stephens Ure Wright 
Absent or not voting were: Representatives 
Arlington B. Evans Fox Haymond 
M Johnson M. Stephens Waddoups Brown 
S.B. 163, was signed by the Speaker in open session, in the presence of the 
House, and returned to the Senate for signature of the President, enrolling and 
transmission to the Governor. * 
r O M M L M C VTIONS FROM THE SENATE 
Mr. Speaker: February 28, 1995 
The Senate substituted, amended, and passed, 2nd Sub H B 14 
AMENDMENTS TO LOBBYIST DISCLOSURE LAW, by Representative I 
Tanner, and it is transmitted for further consideration. 
Annette B. Moore 
Secretary of the Senate 
Communication filed. On motion of Representative Tanner, the House voted 
to refuse to concur with the Senate amendments to 2nd Sub. H.B. 14 and to 
request the Senate to recede from its amendments. 
Mr. Speaker: February 28, 1995 
The Senate adopted the Joint Conference Committee Report dated February 
28, 1995, and passed H.B. 36, REVISION OF ALIMONY STANDARDS, by 
Representative J. Haymond, and it is transmitted for further consideration. 
Annette B. Moore 
Secretary of the Senate 
Communication filed. 
2ND JOINT CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT 
Mr. Speaker: February 28, 1995 
Your Conference Committee, consisting of Senators Taylor, Hillyard, and 
Money, and Representatives Haymond, Ure, and Atkinson to which was referred 
H.B. 36, REVISION OF ALIMONY STANDARDS, by Representative Brent 
Haymond, proposes the following amendments: 
1. Page 3, Line 17: 
Goldenrod: 
Remove the brackets and reinstate "and" 
2. Page 3, Line 18: 
Goldenrod: 
Delete ": and" and insert a period 
3. Page 3, Line 18a: 
Goldenrod: 
Delete line 18a 
4. Page 3, Line 18a: 
Goldenrod: 
After line 18a insert "(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties 
in determining alimony/1 
5. Page 4, Line 7: 
Goldenrod: 
After "alimony" insert "or issue a new order for alimony" and delete 
the remainder of line 7 
6. Page 4, Line 7a: 
Goldenrod: 
Delete "circumstances that justify that action" 
7. Page 4, Line 8: 
Goldenrod: 
After "entered" insert ". unless the court finds extenuating 
circumstances that justify that action" 
8. Page 4, Line 17: 
Goldenrod: 
After "unless" delete "at the time the alimony is scheduled to end" and 
insert ". at any time prior to termination of alimony." 
9. Page 4a, Line 27a: 
Goldenrod: 
After line 27a insert: 
"Section 2. Legislative Intent. 
It is not the intent of the Legislature that termination of alimony based 
on cohabitation with another person in accordance with Subsection 
30-3-5(9). be interpreted in any way to condone such a relationship for 
any purpose." 
Senator Craig Taylor 
Senate Chair 
Representative Brent Haymond 
House Chair 
Communication filed. On motion of Representative Haymond, the House 
voted to adopt the Joint Conference Committee Report to H.B. 36. 
H.B. 36, as amended by the Joint Conference Committee, then passed on the 
following roll call: 
Yeas, 66; Nays, 0; Absent or not voting, 9. 




































































Absent or not voting were: Representatives 
Alexander Davis Ellertson Garn 
Hatch Matthews Smith M. Stephens 
Tuttle 
H.B. 36, as amended by the Joint Conference Committee, transmitted to the 
Senate for signature of the President. 
MISCELLANEOUS BUSINESS 
On motion of Representative Adair, under suspension of the rules, the House 
voted to reconsider its action on S.B. 173. 
RECONSIDERATION OF S.B. 173 
S.B. 173, UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT - AMENDMENTS, was 
before the House on its reconsideration. 
On motion of Representative Adair, the bill was amended as follows: 
1. Page 2, Line 2: 
Delete "or fetus" 
S.B. 173, as amended, then passed on the following roll call: 
Yeas, 73; Nays, 1; Absent or not 
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COMMUNICATIONS FROM THL HOL sL 
lr President February 28,1995^ 
The House passed as amended, H.B 345 CREATION OF UTAH STATE•£ 
1
 MR CORPORATION, by Representative K Smith, and it is transmitted for^ 
msideration, and 
The House passed, as amended, H.B. 344, APPROPRIATION FOR1* 
CLASSROOM SUPPLIES, by Representative R Bigelow, et al and it is' 
transmitted for consideration, and 
The House passed, as amended, H.B. 185, CRIME INVOLVING A-
WEAPON, by Representative D Bresnahan, and it is transmitted tor 
consideration, and 
The House passed, as amended, H.B. 450 AMENDMENTS TO COUNTY 
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTING, b\ Representative R Short, and it is ^ 
ransrrutted for consideration, and 
The House passed, as amended, H.B. 418 DISPLACED DEFENSE, 
WORKERS ASSISTANCE AND DEFENSE INDUSTRY AMENDMENTS by 
Representative G Protzman, and it is transmitted for consideration, and 
The House passed, as amended H.B. 304, USED TIRE MANAGEMENT 
AMENDMENTS, by Representatnt D Ure, and it is transmitted tor 
consideration * 
Carole E Peterson, Chief Clerk% 
Communication filed H.B. 343, H.B. 344, H.B. 185, H.B. 450, H.B. 418^; 
and H.B. 304, were read the first time and referred to the President oi the Senate / 
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT 
Mr President February 28, 1995 
Your conference Committee, consisting of Senators Taylor, Hillyard, and 
Money, and Representatives Haymond, Ure, and Atkinson who which wa$ 
referred H.B. 36, Revision of Alimony Standards, by Rep Brent Haymond 
proposes the following amendments 
1 Page 3, Line 17 (goldenrod copy) 
Remove the brackets and reinstate "and' 
2 Page 3, Line 18 (goldenrod copy) 
Delete *. and and insert a period 
ADay44 SENATE JOURNAL 869 
^ 3 Page , Line 18a (goldenrod copy) 
A Delete line 18a 
4 Page 3, Line 18a (goldenrod copy) 
After line 18a insert 
"(b) The court mav consider the fault of the parties in determining 
alimony/' 
Renumber remaining subsections accordingly 
Page 4, Line 7 (goldenrod copy) 
After "alimony" insert "or issue a new order for alimony" and delete 
the remainder of line 7 
Page 4, Line 7a (goldenrod copy) 
Delete "circumstances that justify that actior. 
finds extenuating 
2l 7. Page 4, Line 8 (goldenrod copy) 
Atter "entered" insert ". unless iht tc i 
circumstances that justify that action" 
8 Page 4, Line 17 (goldenrod copy) 
After "unless" delete "at the time the alimony is scheduled to end" and 
insert", at any time poor to termination of alimony/' 
9. Page 4a, Line 27a (goldenrod copy) 
After line 27a insert 
"Section 2, Legislative Intent, 
It is not the intent of the Legislature that termination of alimony based 
on cohabitation with another person in accordance with Subsection 
30-3-5(9). be interpreted in any way to condone such a relationship for 
any purpose," 
Craig Taylor, Senate Chair 
Brent Haymond, House Chair 
Report filed On motion of Senator Taylor, the Senate voted to adopt the 
Conference Committee Repor1 H.B. 36 passed on the following roll call 
leas, 24; Nays, 0; Absent, 5. 
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' Day 44 
SECOND READING CALENDAR 
On motion of Senator Holmgren, under suspension of the rules, H.B. 138, 
WATER AND IRRIGATION - CRITERIA FOR SMALL AMOUNT 
APPLICATIONS, was read the second and third times. 
Mr. President: February 20,1995 
The Energy, Natural Resources, and Agriculture Committee reports a 
favorable recommendation on H.B. 138, WATER AND IRRIGATION -




Committee report read and adopted. Senator Holmgren explained the bill 
The bill passed on the following roll call: 
Yeas, 27; Nays, 0; Absent, 2. 
Voting in the affirmative were: Senators 
SENATE JOURNAL 871 
On motion of Senator Hillyard, under suspension of the rules, H.B. 159, 
UNIFORMITY OF PENALTY STRUCTURE ON CRIMINAL OFFENSES, was 
read the second and third times. 
Mr. President: February 20, 1995 
The Judiciary Committee reports a favorable recommendation on H.B. 159, 
UNIFORMITY OF PENALTY STRUCTURE ON CRIMINAL OFFENSES, by 
Representative R. Ellertson. 
Craig L. Taylor 
Committee Chair 
Committee report read and adopted. Senator Hillyard explained the bill. The 
bill passed on the following roll call: 
Yeas, 28; Nays, 0; Absent, 1. 





























Absent was: Senator 
Howell 
H.B. 138 was signed by the President of the Senate in open session and 
returned to the House. 
H.B. 159 was signed by the President of the Senate in open session and 
returned to the House. 
?r On motion of Senator Steele, under suspension of the rules, H.B. 31, PUBLIC 
SCHOOL RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS, was read the second and third times. 
. Mr. President: February 20, 1995 
The Transportation and Public Safety Committee reports a favorable 
recommendation on H.B. 31, PUBLIC SCHOOL RESIDENCY 
REQUIREMENTS, by Representative M. Dillree. 
David H. Steele 
Committee Chair 
Committee report read and adopted. Senator Steele explained the bill. 
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RESEARCH OH Aimom 
L mrnomjcnon 
TWs toemorsnduni briefly dismisses alimony award* in the IMurd Siirt£S And 
{ttrtktibriy 113 Utah, &fem spedfinilly il addresses IWO quesiioas coaasejintlisg alimony: finfl, 
wfcu arc ihc MsioriOL! purposes for awarding alimony, find do Awards of fclinsoHY In Uiab 
follow sh&se purposes; aod sesood* wbeu is it agpropii&ie to ttrmimfc alimony awards based 
Oft cohabitttkm sud sexual cooiact UnforamirteJy, due 10 the timlted time avsQ&ide rftar Iks 
recent Leghiative Special Session, our research £as been oecBSsarily &sited. 
EL HISTORICAL INTENT IN AWARDING ALIMONY 
A. f^irjwes of Alimony in the United Stales* 
L Alftnwiy as fodcteffl ft*. Nop-Absolute Divorce in fopland 
As whh many early niks of Aiwricafi law, ih& £OJ*e£pit of granuag alimony ioc&eot 
to divotct was imparted from Eflgteal prior ta ilie iefano of jhe English oo&rt system m 
I85?t &*s English &de»tttfk&! cows Awarded alimony in crojiuttkus wife a dhwrct a 
4
 && Hotter K O a k Jfc.33fe^SE^ tfff.lfctoftSttBS 220-24 
C2d«L 1987). 
4»Sn^O#ttrf * &kIjfeaty, tMiMm * *#m3&-i0& 
$*tn$o m jtar* * Thk type of tilvom wibmte&A husband *»# wife la Hve separately, feat did 
t*m fac ttcm faa& the marriage towk Tte award ^ alimony was ttaply t idtectiofc of tfee 
femhwJ'i tmiiiiiiitig marital doty 10 msppott &c wife, tlift wifc*i isaed for impart wa* pm 
in 19th «seutmy fisygiaad baam& of jfee coritroj war pr$pmy jjivta tci &e tebaad, and ike 
ttai&d utiaabet $f toptoyiaeai oppcattoto ifor w<rae&, itowwer, whea alkaooy was 
Ewanfcd in Ste United Slates it was pvtn in cooiicciion with ihsolu^ divorce, obscuring ihe 
bmcdcaJ {Eposes of Jtaooy itwank 
Shmz t&lo&lai HmtAt, alimony im h&m awarded te the Itei&d Sffln to ccmjuMciou 
wjife absolute «Jivampe„ The authority 10 gram alimony is mai tay ** &&&&&• Abhm$h ntaify 
all toles have stamtes providing for alimony* there is a lack of &%n'&mwt between sMote, 
legal acfaolart, mi cogrts as ID the impropriate piitrposes of a l iases feme see iZi&ooy as a 
contiouaiicm of the support lhat a spoti&£ was jt&tttkd to xecdvc whik ihe marriage exis^d, 
others telteys that «Umony serves to provide dfiift&g&s for d?£ wrongful breach of the 
marrkgt comract, whik oilers are of the opiaioo thai alimony jserra as a pea&fay fat the 
ItecMag apoajus* Cfcjier fusctiofs often refeiral to juidude support for the taswdkn of lbs 
children of Lhs ouwriafe, eo#?peH$aifcm ftsf service provided daring ibe uumrMfe or 
0ppamini&& foregone, wfiik o&ea arjm that ii serves no useful ftmciioti whatever. It is 
afeo OTj&DH&nt tD note thai ibc United Static Supnime Coast has bald that sia&s&s imposing 
atiia&ay *mly on hiishand* fcftd in fsvor of wives vioiaies Ifee equ^l p^ oDecuoo cl^Bc of she 
Hailed Sinto Consiimii0n.J Tfetis* alimony ahotiid te availabte i<s eiithci: spouse, i im to 
<^bscurfei| ?hc historical purposes <sf sliiDcaiy, 
^* jfaffira Uraf In. AwcjBng Alimony 
Oi-v^ ai i&£ ladt of mnsetLOT? tsn A JC^OTHI «ocW policj* fcelitod jdimwy, r t e t exfes a 
wicte variety of JputiScaiiGiss for iwardiftj^  afimo&y,, provided by siskin and ease kw lo be 
a$ed a ^stemiimng wteiter aJlmi?ny 13 appjt^naie lo a given c&se. The Mowing i& a S?*L of 
The m&st cooinioD jtasiillcatiD^ qse-d in wardhg almjncy: 
a
 Alixsofiy was also given in conjuaclloa wi& ihc PadianjiKiii^ ry divcircerSbe only 
alxsotute divorce avtuialnte in EhglatKl at lhat ttme, However, scholars have concluded to si 
was i&s esoc^i^siieai law ikat kllusaced Amcncan kw Jggy.g.g,. Komef H. O&rit, Ix.t The 
Law of Dowiestic Hel^rio^ In dte U.oted S^tgs 220, 221 {2d cd, 1937); Vtimer md Hi/Abut* 
IMKtmpc^ Bzdk£tmmi of .Athaa^y U_w..and its ftresent S^atotwv SmiciOT, 6 Law A 
Co^!«mp, Prohs, 197 (1939). 
1
 ftEv,,<ta, 440 DA m ami 
iBS^ feffeam ffif A P W AWfa 
*t 
/ 
Dtoetim of the trial court 
The defemkflt's ability 10 pay, 
* Heeds, 
for j^iMStaitvft, at i&cnt-iwa, alimony* 
'uraaueat for coi&ibiiiloa lo the edaaiiimi* ittink& & j*tsfe$$it»ial 
of the oih^r spouse, 
fkult «f the parties^ 
;e fend beattb ttf tie fwurtic^  
uraLioo of niirrkgf, 
tenfold of living wilhln the msmage; mi 
Chtar dwacta,is&& sach as financial obBgatSo&s tad pstm&fiifil property. 
Whclbcr these factors or justifimton* are welded *ud evaluated m any pmkulm cm 
varies greatly from $$&& to state.4 
B. Pujposes of Altroonj In Utah5 
in Utah* tra! cowrts would appear to feave broad discretion in awarding ilimoay 
fcecaosae the proc&e&ng is equitable in nature,* However* semil comiao&Jy ti&d porposes 
mt ofieo ghfeo. fim, t& enable da recdying spmuwe la nurfniim, *$ nearly *$ pasdbto, the 
Stodani «tf living enjoyed during &2 maniap; seconds to jntvtm &e spoost item becoming 
& public C&arge; fc&d fisfedL to &|ti*lifie tbe parites* standard of living Tbe$e purposes lead fco 
ibra? factors «$e?d by ifce Uiafe wuns, known JBS *JooesH factors, io deienslne $ reasonable 
H^nKHiy award" fiist* the ftBaodai conditions snd needs of the ig&eivinjg spoose; ^ second* die 
stoCiify of #*e receiving spouse $a prodiKe » syffieie&t incai^; md ftSfd, ti& jf&fy of the 
Sspparfisi; spaasfc 10 provide jRippajt* 
4
 For a mmmBFf of tally kw m ibe stales jgat Timothy B* Walter. ffemly Lqw In foe 
fifty States: An Overview. 26 F&m. L. Q, 322-420 (i9#3>, 
5
 & £ BXU. X Legal SauL, Summary of Utah Family law ft 33J to 13,$J 0980)-
* Ui*h Code Ana 130-M (Supp- 1993); Johnson v,. Johnson. 855 ?2d 250,251 (UuA 
App I993X 
?
 Ro^rtgy>, Roberts. 835 POd 193. 19$ (Uteh App, 19»Xgtjnq Moans v. Mganji 790 
P,2d 116. 121 (Utah App, I990)X 
* totals y, tataa, *3S pjd m* m mm App. mzy^nt fa» ?, RB«.?OP 
R3d 1072,1075 flJi^fe !9S5^ 
C Summary; life* Iftirpwt tf AXkmtof 
Tb& jm*pa$ei <rf ritaoay fa Utah, Wx tht |»nt|>aBes of illmcmy t^oawkJe* seetti 10 
h m been developed from teioxtaal amkijra of minings ami famfly &a* iuwe b&tn t&pi&y 
<tfmifa& Some gchaka irgafc &kt atlmcaiy *&» hm#er mvm my Useful faaolaa* wb&re 
®&im xtpw &a* h operate m pmpesty protect Mid caapcagite ®patim ai «te teratafttioii of 
jasmagt, ft is difficult m sty w t e t o Utah kw follow tn*dkjcmjri pwposes for alimony due 
m cofiflkts in defining #& frad&iottal purposes of fclimoay, Furthermost «ft# 00 rapkl «ochl 
m& economic s t e g e ft ii tmttear wt&ttar tmdifcntl purposes Should itiB be cantered 
fcpprapriatt. It may be thai the scasimta&e will wist* 10 further m&y U t f l Cftttictt policy 01? 
iriiiaofly $0 &temdj3e wfte&er it *mm tte proper and desirttf punp^e. 
i l l TERMINATION OF ALIMONY 
A, Seacual Contact find CoimbJtoifcli m Gtmn8& ft*r Termination 
*• Heterosexual contact 
Aimo-j&t all g&szs ttrmmmz altoKmy tipoa the ^marriage ot Lbe jfedpfeaL However, 
*& coh^itatioa became man? j?rtva!e&i #vcr time sad &e nsed «rose fof cahabittatfoa 4$ be 
ieoo{ni2Cd as a iu&» 10 which legal friinfens- smd bt#cJIt& &*ml& acotie, smites began ta 
permit the femsinsiiou of Simony ptyme&is io fcohabiiaiian £taatiai$& AishougJj these 
£&t9t£S have JK& b^en wiMy cfeatftenged ao ^ast&atiocuiJ gfOTflds* w!>£3 dfcdkiifes tsave 
grisen 6 s stasuiESL have been uitteld an te eq^ti p&icttta&« due paxe&t and privacy 
smlyses* Oir^ntly, &&yeal states tafnsuuc Jdimany fc&setf on ccto&*rii0& &&# sextft! 
oomtaci with A petr^tt of lfae spposise £&JLW 
No €&s£ has mtn found address!^ lte few of &e co*i$toi0&aHry of hom&s^ xiu&I 
sexual contact lemiiiuuifl^ alimony.14 Although tb& issrituticn of ibis issue fe usKkar due to 
9
 gqfc.feJL Rctens v. Roberts, 657 P.2d 153 {OU, IS83); in re Marna^ 2e tf Edwarcb, 
698 R2d 542 (Or. App 1985): Shns v. Sim&. 253 S i 2 d 762 {GaL 1W9). 
35
 J&& Txni0ii>y B+ Writer. Family b w in fey Bftv Slate: An Omvipw. 26 F ^ B , t , Q-
36^367 (I9»). 
11
 H^y&» Cmty & Deanis CBffora, A UtAQw^k faJtis^.mMJMSfflBfc* W* 
etf, JS$i) efioe co iftw cises irii&ii fwpjiteifly Imve pennltetf modiffiyca&jt or lenntodiM «f 
t&acny pEyin«iitss %me& 0H 3t»om-oi!sai»i2 JicSvity, HOVWJV^ PI* Ms Mmms^m hm been 
4 
the absence of case law, it appears that an amendment to Utah's alimony provisions removing 
the "opposite sex" requirement for terminating alimony based on cohabitation may be 
constitutionally permissible. On its face, this amendment would apply equally to all persons, 
because it would remove the sexual orientation barrier formerly imposed in alimony 
situations. 
If the amended statute was challenged on equal protection grounds, a court would 
probably apply either a mid-tier or a strict scrutiny test Courts would be unlikely to apply a 
"meie rationality" test because this test has traditionally been reserved for economic issues.12 
However, if a court did decide to apply a "mere rationality* level of scrutiny in this case, the 
statute would almost certainly be upheld because courts are extremely deferential to 
legislative intent under this standanl13 If, however, tbe court determines that sexual 
orientation is a "suspect class", the court may apply a strict scrutiny standard.14 If the court 
applies strict scrutiny, the statute would likely be stricken unless it is necessary to promote a 
compelling governmental interest15 to practice, strict scrutiny almost always leads to a 
finding of unconstitutionality.16 Finally, if the court decided to apply mid~tier scrutiny, a test 
traditionally reserved for cases involving classification based on gender and illegitimacy,17 the 
result would be unclear. Under mid-tier scrutiny, the court assesses whether the means 
unverifiable because the authors did not provide citations to these cases. Additionally, the 
statutory schemes under which these cases were decided may have changed, and the authors 
were not contacted. 
n
 See Lindslev v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co». 220 U.S. 61 (1911). 
14
 The U.S. Supreme Court has never recognized sexual orientation as a suspect class and 
declined to rule on this issue in Bowers v. Hardwick. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). However, in the 
recent Hawaii Supreme Court case, Baehr v. Lewin. 852 P.2d 44 (Hawaii 1993), the court 
held that Hawaii's statute restricting marriages to male and female partnerships establishes a 
sex-based classification which is subject to strict judicial scrutiny under an equal protection 
analysis of the state's constitutional civil rights provisions. Although Hawaii determined that 
sex or gender based classifications are subject to strict scrutiny, the United States Supreme 
Court has afforded only mid-tier scrutiny to such classifications. 
15
 See Citv of Richmond v. J.A. Croson. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
16
 j § ^ Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term Forward: In Search of Evolving 
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Eouaf Protection. 86 Harv. L Rev. 8 
(1972). 
17
 Nowak, Rotunda, and Young, Handbook on Constitutional Law (3rd e& 1986). 
5 
chosen by the legislature serves important governmental objectives and whether the legislation 
is substantially related to achieving those objectives.18 
Legislators and policymakers should be aware that while it may be constitutional to 
amend Utah's statute to remove the sexual orientation barrier, this legislative change could 
provide an argument in litigation to gay or lesbian plaintiffs that a recognition of their 
relationship has been established by inference and could be asserted to apply in other 
contexts. The merits of this argument and the likelihood of its assertion remains unexplored-
V. CONCLUSION 
The laws of the various $me$ regarding alimony are diverse and rapidly changing. 
Because the historical purposes of alimony are unclear, modern jurisdictions currently diverge 
in their interpretations of alimony policy. These purposes have been further obscured by 
changing familial, economic, and social relationships. The committee may wish to reevaluate 
the role, scope, and purposes of alimony in light of these changing relationships. 
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Mr President February 28 1995 J 
The House passed, as amended, H.B. 343, CREATION OF UTAH STATE 
FAIR CORPORATION, by Representative K Smith, and it is transmitted for 
consideration, and 
The House passed, as amended, H.B. 344, APPROPRIATION FOR 
CLASSROOM SUPPLIES, by Representative R Bigelow, et al, and it is 
transmitted for consideration, and 
The House passed, as amended, H.B. 185, CRIME INVOLVING A 
WEAPON, by Representative D Bresnahan, and it is transmitted for 
consideration, and 
The House passed, as amended, H.B. 450 AMENDMENTS TO COUNTY 
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTING, by Representative R Short, and it is 
transmitted for consideration, and 
10 
>4 
The House passed, as amended, H.B. 418 DISPLACED DEFENSE **j 
WORKERS ASSISTANCE AND DEFENSE INDUSTRY AMENDMENTS, by 
Representative G Protzman, and it is transmitted tor consideration, and 
The House passed, as amended, H.B. 304 USED TIRE MANAGEMENT 
AMENDMENTS, by Representative D Ure, and it is transmitted tor 
consideration 
Caiole E Peterson, Chief Clerk 
Communication filed H.B. 343, H.B. 344, H.B. 185, H.B. 450, H.B. 418, 
and H.B. 304, were read the first time and referred to the President of the Senate 
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT 
Mr President February 28, 199S 
Your conference Committee, consisting of Senators Taylor Hillyard, and 
Money, and Representatives Haymond, Ure, and Atkinson who which was ^J 
relerred H.B. 36, Revision ol Alimony Standards by Rep Brent Haymond, 
proposes the following amendments 
1 Page 3, Line 17 (goldenrod copy) 
Remove the brackets and leinstate and 
2 Page \ Line 18 (goldenrod copy) 
Delete ". and ' and insert a penod 
4 
SENATE JOURNAL 
Page , Line 18a (goldenrod copy) 
Delete line 18a 
Page 3, Line 18a (goldenrod copy) 
After line 18a insert 
869 
"(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining 
alimony," 
Renumber remaining subsections accordingly 
5 Page 4, Line 7 (goldenrod copy) 
After "alimony" insert "or issue a new order for alimony77 and delete 
the remainder of line 7 
6 Page 4, Line 7a (goldenrod copy) 
Delete "circumstances that justify that action" 
7 Page 4, Line 8 (goldenrod copy) 
After "entered" insert ". unless the court finds extenuating 
circumstances that justify that action" 
8 Page 4, Line 17 (goldenrod copy) 
After "unless77 delete "at the time the ahmonv is scheduled to end77 and 
msen , at any time pnor to termination of alimony," 
9 Page 4a, Line 27a (goldenrod copy) 
After line 27a insert 
"Section 2. Legislative Intent. 
It is not the intent of the Legislature that termination of alimony based 
on cohabitation with another person in accordance with Subsection 
30-3-5(9). be interpreted in any way to condone such a relationship for 
any purpose " 
Craig Taylor, Senate Chair 
Brent Haymond, House Chair 
Report filed On motion of Senator Taylor, the Senate voted to adopt the 
Conference Committee Report H.B. 36 passed on the following roll call 
•Veas,24:Navs ft- Ahc<>«f * 
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H.B. 36 was transmitted to the House 
SECOND READING CALENDAR 
On motion of Senator Holmgren, under suspension of the rules, H.B, 138, 
WATER AND IRRIGATION - CRITERIA FOR SMALL AMOUNT 
APPLICATIONS, was read the second and third times 
Mr President February 20,1995 
The Energy, Natural Resources, and Agiiculture Committee reports a 
favorable recommendation on H.B 138, WATER AND IRRIGATION -




Committee report read and adopted Senator Holmgren explained the bill 
The bill passed on the following roll call 
Yeas, 27; Nays, 0; Absent, 2. 
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On motion of Senator Hillyard, under suspension of the rules H.B. 159 
UNIFORMITY OF PENALTY STRUCTURE ON CRIMINAL OFFENSES, was 
read the second and third times 
Mr President February 20, 1995 
The Judiciary Committee reports a favorable recommendation on H.B. 159, 
UNIFORMITY OF PENALTY STRUCTURE ON CRIMINAL OFFENSES, by 
Representative R Ellertson 
Craig L Taylor 
Committee Chair 
Committee report read and adopted Senator Hillyard explained the bill The 
» bill passed on the following roll call 
Yeas, 28; Nays, 0; Absent, 1. 





























H.B 138 was signed by the President ol the Senate in open session and 





Absent was: Senator 
Howell 
H.B. 159 was signed by the President of the Senate in open session and 
returned to the House 
On motion of Senator Steele, under suspension of the rules, H.B. 31, PUBLIC 
SCHOOL RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS, was read the second and third times 
Mr President February 20, 1995 
The Transportation and Public Safety Committee reports a favorable 
recommendation on H.B. 31, PUBLIC SCHOOL RESIDENCY 
, REQUIREMENTS, by Representative M Dillree 
David H Steele 
, Committee Chair 
•' Committee report read and adopted Senator Steele explained the bill 
X Senator S t P n h * » n c r \ n nnr *A T U ^ i~ i t 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BECKY SUE MYERS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MISTY MYERS 
Civil No. 064400347 




COUNTY OF ) 
MISTY MYERS, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am the adult daughter of Petitioner and Respondent in this matter. 
2. I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein, and if called upon to 
testify, I would testify in accordance with this affidavit. 
DEFENDANT'S^ 
EXHIB ITWV- - 'Sir <•' 
My mother, Becky Sue Myers, had an ongoing, romantic relationship with a 
foster-care boy, Mike, while both of them lived at my grandmother's home 
from about April, 2007 through August, 2007. 
My mother had been living at my grandmother's home beginning in about 
April, 2006. 
In about April, 2007, Mike moved into the home as my grandmother's 
foster-care child. He resided there until he was removed from the home and 
my grandmother's license to care for foster children was removed in August, 
2007. 
From April through the present, Mike and my mother have been inseparable. 
They have been and are always together whenever I see them. 
In May, 2007, my mom picked my upon from Smith's in Orem, Utah. When 
she got there, she told me that she had to pick up the boys (my 
grandmother's foster boys). When she stopped to pick up the boys, she told 
me I had to get in the back so Mike could ride up front with her. I thought 
her behavior odd. Her interaction with Mike on that trip caused me to 
believe that she had a romantic interest in him. 
At the end of May, 2007, my sister, Lacy, had a birthday party for my niece 
and nephew at a park in Provo. The party was just a family party. As my 
mom was part of the family, she was invited to go to the party. She and 
2 
Mike arrived together and were together throughout the party, sitting side by 
side, and treating each other as though they were boyfriend and girlfriend. 
They left together. I thought it was strange how my mom was acting around 
Mike. 
9. In August, 2007,1 helped my sister move. She had things in a storage unit 
that she shared with my mom, so we went there to get her stuff 
10. While I was at the storage unit, I noticed letters sitting on top of a stroller, 
addressed to Becky from Mike. When I later asked my Mom about the 
letters, she appeared embarrassed and defensive. I asked her what was going 
on between her and Mike. She told me it was none of my business. I asked 
her if she knew what would happen if they got caught together. She told me 
she knew what would happen. From that conversation, it was clear to me 
that my mother was having a romantic relationship with Mike. 
11. Several times during the months my mom and Mike lived with my 
grandmother, when I went to visit I was told that my mom was not home, 
and she had gone out with Mike, just the two of them (which was against 
Y.H.A. rules for the foster care. 
12. Also, she would sometimes visit me at my apartment or my sister's house. 
She was always with Mike and not the other foster boys. 
3 
13. I recently learned that my mom and Mike are continuing to see each other, 
even after Mike was removed from the home and transferred to a new place 
in Salt Lake City. 
DATED this ao ih day of _ DebfoaqJ , 2008. 
MISTY MYERS^ 
Affiant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me t h i s ^ ^ day of \ '-PJArUCL ^V , 
2008 by MISTY MYERS. 
ADDENDUM F 
AFFIDAVIT OF BRYCE MYERS 
TK 
GUY L. BLACK, No. 6182 
GREENWOOD & BLACK 
Attorneys for Respondent 
1840 North State Street, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 377-4652 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4673 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BECKY SUE MYERS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
TRACY LYNN MYERS, 
Respondent. 
AFFIDAVIT OF BRYCE MYERS 








BRYCE MYERS, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
I am the adult son of Petitioner and Respondent in this matter. 
I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein, and if called upon to 
testify, I would testify in accordance with this affidavit. 
3. I do not have any doubt that my mother, Becky Sue Myers, was having a 
sexual relationship with Mike, a foster boy, during the time both of them 
lived with my grandmother, from about May through August, 2007. 
Mike often spoke about Mom to me when he and I hung out together. He 
spoke of her as his girlfriend. I saw them flirting with each other all the 
time. They also slept in the same room together, although they tried to hide 
the fact that they were sleeping together. Mom would go downstairs and 
sleep on the couch instead of sleeping in her room. Mike would go 
downstairs too. I caught him "sleeping55 on the floor next to the couch, 
while my mother was "sleeping" on the couch. 
Sometime during May, 2007, Mike came to me crying because he had a 
fight with Mom, because they were having a rocky time in their relationship. 
He told me that he understood why Dad left Mom. He acted like a heart-
broken, love-sick boy. 
Sometime near the Fourth of July, 2007, my mom called me while Mike and 
I were at my friend's house. She flew into a jealous rage over the phone, 
because she thought Mike was hanging out with girls. She told me she was 
done with him because he was cheating on her. 
On several other occasions, the same jealous behavior happened. She had to 
be with Mike all the time, or she became jealous. My mom was always 
calling me when I was hanging out with Mike. She was always freaked out 
claiming that he was with some other girl, instead of with her. 
Sometime around August, Mike came to me and told me that he had gotten 
into a fight again with my mom. He told me he had punched out the window 
2 
of her car because he was upset that he had found a crack cocaine pipe in her 
purse. It is common knowledge that my mom has had a drug problem. 
>. After Mike was removed from my grandparent's home, after their foster-
care license was revoked, Mike was moved up to Salt Lake. My mom came 
to me sometime shortly after the move and asked if she could take my car to 
Salt Lake to see Mike because her car wouldn't make the trip. I called my 
Mom the next morning because I needed my car to get to work. She told me 
she had just left Mike's house and was on her way back. 
DATED this Q^j day of FfjRUi fifty , 2008. 
^rS 
MY^E MYERS / 
Affiant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this^-l^day of f-^JbruUa; 
2008 by BRYCE MYERS. 
rv 
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Notary Public ^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 1 H day of October, 2010,1 hand delivered two 
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to Samuel M. Barker and Jeffrey A. 
Callister, attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant, at the following address, together with a pdf 
copy on CD: 
Samuel M. Barker 
Jeffrey A. Callister 
5295 South Commerce Drive, Suite 200 
Murray, Utah 84107 
